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Abstract
This paper discusses the e¤ects of horizontal mergers on innovation. We rely on the
existing academic literature and our own research work to present the various positive
and negative e¤ects of mergers on innovation. Our analysis shows that the overall impact
of a merger on innovation may be either positive or negative and sheds light on the
circumstances under which each of these scenarios is likely to arise. We derive a number of
policy implications regarding the way innovation e¤ects should be handled by competition
authorities in merger control and highlight the di¤erences with the analysis of price e¤ects.
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The debate about the impact of mergers on innovation is not a recent one. First, it is tightly
related to the long-standing debate about the e¤ect of competition on innovation initiated
by Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962). Second, the e¤ects of mergers on innovation have
been discussed, sometimes heatedly, in a large number of cases over the last decade both in
the U.S.1 and the EU.2
While not being new, the debate on the e¤ect of mergers on innovation has been partic-
ularly lively in Europe since the European Commissions use of a broader innovation theory
of harm in the recent Dow/DuPont case. In previous merger cases, the Commissions inno-
vation concerns were about the development and commercialization of well-dened pipeline
products for which a substantial part of the R&D process has been completed. In contrast, in
the merger between Dow and DuPont, the Commission considered the e¤ects of the merger
on overall R&D investments, including those for products and technologies for which the
researchpart of the R&D process will be performed after the merger takes place. Further-
more, the statement of the Commission in its press release that only ve players are globally
active throughout the entire research & development (R&D) processhas been interpreted by
some commentators as meaning that ve-to-four mergers may be considered in the future as
particularly problematic by the European Commission if they happen in industries in which
R&D is a key element of competition.
The reasons behind this debate lie in the opposite e¤ects that mergers can have on rms
incentives to invest in R&D. These e¤ects will be discussed extensively throughout the paper
but let us provide here a simple example that illustrates this point. Consider two rms
that produce similar products and engage in R&D in order to develop the next-generation
product. Assume that if only one rm manages to do so, it becomes a monopolist, while if
both of them innovate, they compete against each other. This implies that a rms R&D
investment may have a negative impact on its rival, independently of whether the latter
also invests in R&D or not. If the two rms merge they will maximize their joint prots
and, consequently, they will internalizeany negative impact of each ones R&D investment
on the others prot. This may tend to lower the merged entitys incentives to invest in
R&D. However, this is not the only e¤ect at work. The merger also relaxes product market
competition, which implies that a rm succeeding in developing the next-generation product
will be able to sell it at a higher price. This tends to increase the returns to R&D investment
and, thereby, may increase the merged entitys incentives to innovate. The overall impact of
the merger on innovation is a priori ambiguous because of the existence of these two opposite
e¤ects.
1See e.g., Gilbert and Greene (2015).
2 In particular, several merger cases have been cleared by the European Commission subject to the divestiture
of R&D assets. See e.g., Metronic/Coviden, Novartis/GSK, Pzer/Hospira, and General Electric/Alstom.
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This paper relies on the existing academic literature and our own research work to present
the potential e¤ects of mergers on innovation. In line with the current assessment of mergers
in practice, we make a distinction between the e¤ects of mergers on the merging rms(and, to
a lesser extent, their rivals) incentives to innovate for given innovation capabilities, and their
impact on the merging partnersability to innovate. We also distinguish between the e¤ects of
mergers on R&D investments in product innovation and in process innovation because some
of the e¤ects we highlight are relevant only (or particularly) for one of these two types of
innovation.
Considering rst the e¤ects of mergers on product innovation, we start with a description
of what we call the innovation diversion e¤ect. This e¤ect stems from the impact that a rms
innovation has on its rivalssales. A key point of our analysis is that this impact can be either
positive or negative. In the latter scenario, the internalization of this externality a¤ects
negatively the merged entitys incentives to invest in R&D, while it a¤ects them positively in
the former scenario.
Next, we turn to two e¤ects of mergers on innovation that follow from the standard market
power e¤ect of mergers on prices. We call the rst one the demand expansion e¤ect. This e¤ect
is positive and captures the idea that the margin increase induced by a merger provides the
merging rms with higher incentives to innovate in order to increase their demand. The second
e¤ect we identify is a margin expansion e¤ect : in the absence of e¢ ciency gains, a merger
leads to a decrease in the merging rmsoutput, which lowers the rmsincentives to innovate
in order to increase their margins (by setting higher prices).
Finally, we consider the spillover e¤ect. As has been emphasized in the literature, a given
rms investment in R&D may not only benet the rm itself but also its rivals through
technological spillovers. When such a positive innovation externality exists, it creates another
channel through which a merger can lead to more innovation.
We pay special attention to the recent theoretical papers by Federico, Langus and Valletti
(2017a, 2017b) as they formalize the arguments that the Commission used in the Dow/DuPont
case. In particular, we argue that these two papers provide only a partial picture of the impact
of mergers on innovation and do not justify the authorsclaim that a merger between two
out of a limited number of innovators is likely to lead to a reduction of innovation in a
market characterized by limited knowledge spillovers and in the absence of other possible
countervailing e¢ ciencies. In contrast, Bourreau, Lefouili and Jullien (2018) show that the
overall impact of a merger may be positive even in the worst-case scenario in which the
merger leads to monopoly and there are neither spillovers nor e¢ ciencies.
Turning to the e¤ect of mergers on process innovation, we discuss the in-depth theoretical
study of this issue by Motta and Tarantino (2017). Their analysis is grounded on the existence
of a variant of our margin expansion e¤ect : a rms benet from investing in a cost-reducing
technology is lower if its output is smaller. In the absence of e¢ ciency gains in production, a
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horizontal merger leads to higher prices and smaller output. This creates a channel through
which a merger may decrease the merging rmsincentives to invest in process innovation.
However, they show that this need not be the only e¤ect. First, knowledge spillovers generate
a countervailing e¤ect that could lead to a positive overall e¤ect on innovation. Second, when
investments are observable by rivals, a new strategice¤ect appears, which makes the impact
of a merger generally ambiguous.
We then analyze the R&D complementarities that a merger may induce and show how
they may boost innovation. We also argue that non-R&D related cost reductions induced by
a merger should be taken into account not only to assess the e¤ect of a merger on prices but
also to analyze its impact on innovation.
We derive the implications of our analysis on the way innovation e¤ects should be handled
in merger cases. We argue that a presumption of a negative impact of mergers on innovation
in R&D-intensive industries is not supported by our knowledge of how a merger impacts inno-
vation. We contend instead that competition authorities should perform a thorough balancing
exercise of the opposite e¤ects altering rmsincentives to innovate. We also claim that all
the e¤ects of a merger on the incentives to innovate should be part of the main competitive
assessment carried out by competition authorities. In particular, it should include the analysis
of spillover e¤ects.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents preliminary dis-
cussions that are useful for our analysis and conclusions. Section 3 examines the impact
of a merger on rmsincentives to innovate, holding xed their ability to innovate. Section
4 analyzes the e¤ect of complementarities between R&D assets and non-R&D-related cost
reductions induced by a merger on innovation. Section 5 concludes and derives the policy
implications of our analysis on the assessment of innovation e¤ects in merger control.
2 Competition, mergers and innovation: preliminaries
This section presents preliminary discussions of issues that are relevant to our core analysis in
Sections 3 and 4 and the conclusions we draw in Section 5. We rst briey summarize a few
key contributions to the literature on the relationship between competition and innovation,
and discuss the relevance of this literature for the debate on the impact of mergers on innova-
tion. Second, we point out some fundamental di¤erences between the unilateral price e¤ects
of a merger and its unilateral innovation e¤ects. Third, we illustrate the lack of consensus
among economists about a presumed (negative or positive) sign of the impact of mergers on
innovation.
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2.1 The literature on market structure, competition and innovation
The two seminal positions on the relationship between innovation, market power and competi-
tion can be summarized as follows. The Schumpeterian view contends that market power and
size can promote innovation. In particular, Schumpeter (1942) considered that the short-run
benets from competitive pricing can be outweighed by the long-run benets of market power
on rmsincentives to innovate. In contrast, Arrow (1962) showed that market power is detri-
mental to innovation in certain circumstances. More precisely, he argued that a monopolist
has less incentives to invest in R&D than a rm in a perfectly competitive industry. Key
to his nding is the so-called replacement e¤ect (Tirole, 1988): contrary to a rm facing
strong competition, a monopolist is making substantial prots even if it does not innovate.
Therefore, the di¤erence between post-innovation prots and pre-innovation prots - which
drives the incentives to invest in R&D - is higher under competition than under monopoly.
A crucial assumption for Arrows conclusion to hold is that the monopolist is not facing any
threat of entry. If this condition is not satised then the current monopolist may lose prof-
its if it does not innovate while a potential entrant does. In this case, the monopolist may
have stronger incentives to invest in R&D than a potential entrant: through innovation, the
monopolist may preempt investment by a potential entrant and maintain its monopoly rent
(Gilbert and Newberry, 1982). Tirole (1988) calls this the e¢ ciency e¤ectas it relies on the
fact that entry by a competitor usually lowers industry prots, which makes the monopolists
gain from deterring entry greater than the potential entrants gain from entering the market.
A number of authors have tried to reconcile or combine the contrasting conclusions reached
by Schumpeter and Arrow. A particularly inuential work in this area is the paper by Aghion
et al. (2005). These authors develop a duopoly model where, at each point in time, the in-
dustry can be either in a neck-and-neckstate or in a leader-laggardstate. In the former
state, both rms have the same marginal costs, while in the latter, one of them (the leader)
is more e¢ cient than the other (the laggard). Focusing on cost-reducing innovation, Aghion
et al. (2005) show that in the neck-and-neck scenario rms have stronger incentives to
innovate if competition is more intense. This is what they call the escape the competition
e¤ect, which Shapiro (2012) considers as the ip slide of the Arrow replacement e¤ect.
By contrast, an increase in competition gives a laggard rm less incentives to innovate.3
This is a Schumpeterian e¤ect. By combining these two e¤ects, Aghion et al. (2005) ob-
tain an inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and innovation.4 In a similar
vein, Shapiro (2012) argues that there is no fundamental conict between the insights o¤ered
3 In Aghion et al. (2005), the assumptions of the model are such that a leader does not have incentives to
innovate.
4Gilbert, Riis and Riis (2017) extend the stepwise models in Aghion et al. (2001) and Aghion et al. (2005)
to (symmetric) oligopolies and show that that the predictions of the e¤ects of competition on innovation from
the duopoly models do not generalize to oligopolies.
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by Schumpeter and Arrow. He interprets the formers thesis as saying that stronger post-
innovation competition lowers rmsincentives to innovate, while the latters view contends
that stronger pre-innovation competition leads to higher incentives to innovate.5 Finally,
Gilbert and Greene (2015) emphasize that a rms ability to appropriate the benets of its
investment in R&D is key to understand the di¤erence between Arrows and Schumpeters
conclusions. They argue that weak appropriation supports the Schumpeterian view that size,
and, indirectly, market share promotes innovation. In contrast, if rms can appropriate the
benets from their innovations, Arrows conclusion applies, as prots from existing operations
reduce the net returns to innovation and the incentive to invest in R&D.
Several authors have pointed out that the literature on competition and innovation build-
ing on Schumpeters and Arrows seminal contributions is not directly applicable to merger
analysis (see e.g., Shapiro, 2012; Motta and Tarantino, 2017; Federico, Langus and Valletti,
2017a, 2017b). The main reason for this is that a merger not only leads to a decrease in the
number of rms (which has been used as a measure of competition intensity in a number of
papers6) but also allows the merging rms to coordinate their decisions, in particular at the
R&D stage. In other words, the merging rms can internalize the externalities they were ex-
erting on each other before the merger. However, the fact that policy prescriptions regarding
the treatment of innovation e¤ects in merger control should not rely solely on the (ambiguous)
results put forward by the literature on competition and innovation does not mean that this
literature is not useful at all for merger analysis. On the contrary, as will become apparent in
our analysis, the key e¤ects identied in that literature are still relevant when assessing the
e¤ects of a merger on innovation. For instance, the replacement e¤ect put forward by Arrow
is very similar in nature to the innovation externalitye¤ect driving (partly) the results in
Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a, 2017b).
2.2 Unilateral price e¤ects vs. unilateral innovation e¤ects
Some recent studies have suggested that the analysis of unilateral innovation e¤ects in merger
cases bears resemblance with the analysis of unilateral price e¤ects (see e.g., Federico, 2017;
Federico, Langus and Valletti, 2017a, 2017b). In contrast, we claim that there are three key
di¤erences between competition in prices and competition in innovation that advocate for a
clear distinction between the assessment of innovation e¤ects and that of price e¤ects.
First, while the substitutability between competing products is su¢ cient to justify a pre-
sumption that the merged entity will raise prices absent e¢ ciency gains, the existence of a
potential negative innovation externality is not su¢ cient to make the claim that the merged
5More precisely, Shapiro (2012) interprets the Schumpeterian thesis as saying that the prospect of obtaining
market power is a necessary reward to innovation and Arrows view as meaning that a rm with a vested
interest in the status quo has a smaller incentive than a new entrant to develop or introduce new technology
that disrupts the status quo.
6See e.g., Vives (2008).
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entity will decrease its innovation in the absence of e¢ ciency gains. The reason for this is
that a merger may provide rms with higher incentives to innovate even if the merging rms
investments in R&D exert negative e¤ects on each other. For instance, if the merger leads
to an increase in the merging rms price-cost margins, it may generate higher incentives
to engage in demand-enhancing innovation that may outweigh the e¤ect stemming from the
negative externalities between the merging rms (if such externalities exist).7
Second, a fundamental di¤erence between competition in R&D and competition in prices
is the potential existence of spillover e¤ects in R&D (Salinger, 2016). Those e¤ects capture
the idea that the output of a rms investment in R&D may benet its rivals, through e.g., the
information disclosed in its patents.8 When this positive externality exists, it may compensate
partly, or even outweigh other negative externalities, thus altering substantially the very
nature of the strategic interaction between rms.
Finally, while a static analysis of prices, such as the one performed in a unilateral price
e¤ects exercise, is meaningful, a static analysis of innovation is necessarily reductionist because
of the fundamentally dynamic nature of the innovation process (see e.g., Marshall and Parra,
2018). This process is cumulative both at the rm level and the industry level (Scotchmer,
2004), which implies that a structural change, such as a merger, may have a long-lasting e¤ect
on innovation.
Petit (2018) also questions the transposition of the (standard) unilateral price e¤ects
exercise to innovation e¤ects. He notes in particular that R&D cannot be adjusted as quickly
as prices, which might undermine merging rms ability to discontinue R&D (even when
they have incentives to do so). He also argues that coordination in innovation can dominate
competition in innovation from a welfare perspective and highlights the fact that standard
unilateral e¤ects analysis ignores the organisation of R&D within the merged entity.
2.3 The lack of consensus regarding a presumed e¤ect of mergers on inno-
vation
There is no consensus among economists about a presumed (negative or positive) sign of a
horizontal mergers impact on innovation. The literature shows that the impact of a merger is
generally a combination of positive and negative e¤ects (see, e.g., Katz and Shelanski, 2007;
Shapiro, 2012; Gilbert and Greene, 2015). Leading economists do not agree about how to
balance these e¤ects in merger analysis, and whether there should be a presumption that
mergers harm innovation absent e¢ ciency gains. The comparison of the views expressed by
Katz and Shelanski (2007) and Shapiro (2012) illustrates this point. Katz and Shelanski (2007)
7This e¤ect will be discussed in detail later.
8Note that patent protection does not preclude spillovers as rivals can work around patents to develop
non-infringing alternatives, or build on the knowledge di¤used by patents to invent next-generation prod-
ucts/technologies.
7
recommend that merger review proceed on a more fact-intensive, case-by-case basis where
innovation is at stake, with a presumption that a mergers e¤ects on innovation are neutral
except in the case of merger to monopoly, where there would be a rebuttable presumption of
harm, while Shapiro (2012) argues that we do know enough to warrant a presumption that
a merger between the only two rms pursuing a specic line of research to serve a particular
need is likely to diminish innovation rivalry, absent a showing that the merger will increase
appropriability or generate R&D synergies that will enhance the incentive or ability of the
merged rm to innovate.
The literature, however, does provide guidance regarding the potential e¤ects of a merger
on innovation, which we discuss in detail in the next section.
3 The e¤ects of horizontal mergers on the incentives to inno-
vate
3.1 Key concepts
Prior to analyzing the e¤ects of mergers on innovation, it is worth discussing the nature of the
exercise conducted by competition authorities in merger control and how our analysis relates
to it. As has been emphasized by many authors,9 a merger can be viewed as a combination
of several economic operations that a¤ect market outcomes.
3.1.1 Incentives vs. ability
The rst consequence of a merger is that, holding the organization and technologies xed,
common ownership of two economic entities leads to the coordination of all these entities
actions, with the aim of achieving a common goal, namely the maximization of joint prots.
Coordination implies that any action of one entity is taken by considering the implications
for this entity but also considering the e¤ect on the other merging entity. Thus, each entity,
when determining its pricing, production or innovation strategy, internalizes the e¤ects on
its merging partner. In economic terms, a merger changes the incentives of each merging
rm. In standardmerger analysis (i.e., when innovation e¤ects are not incorporated), the
assessment of the consequences of a change in incentives brought about by a merger is done by
analyzing the unilateral price e¤ects of the merger. Consider for instance a merger between
two car producers. The rst step of the analysis is to evaluate how prices will change, holding
xed the product lines and the organization of production. The presumption regarding the
unilateral e¤ects of a merger on prices is that the changes in rmsincentives will result in
higher prices for each product sold when rms compete in prices.
9See the discussion in Shapiro (2012) for instance.
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However, a merger entails more than just a coordination of the merging rmsactions. It
also a¤ects the merged entitys ability to produce. The new rm controlling all the merging
rmsassets can re-optimize the organization of production. The reallocation of assets and/or
reorganization of production allows the merged entity to reduce marginal costs of production
compared to the pre-merger situation. In the example of car producers, the merging rms can
rationalize production, say by producing all engines in the same factory, or can re-optimize the
product lines of each brand. The assessment of the e¤ect of a merger on the merged entitys
ability to produce is di¢ cult because of its prospective nature. In particular, the quantication
of the e¤ects on nal prices makes an e¢ ciency defense very complicated.
Although somewhat articial,10 the distinction between incentives and ability has proved
useful and provides an operational framework for merger analysis that is consistent with the
legal standards for merger control.
When innovation is to be factored, the analysis becomes signicantly more complex be-
cause innovation a¤ects by nature products and production processes. Since innovation alters
technologies, it is no longer possible to analyze the e¤ect of new incentives resulting from
the merger holding xed production technologies and product lines. However, and precisely
because of the complexity of these e¤ects, the assessment of a merger gains in clarity when
the same methodological approach - focusing rst on incentives and then considering any
merger-induced increase in ability - is adopted. The analysis of incentives should determine
the outcome of the coordination of the merging rmsbehaviors, now holding xed the orga-
nization and technology in terms of R&D and production. In this context, the e¤ect of the
merger on ability relates to the reallocation of resources within the merged entity and the
exploitation of complementarities at two levels: R&D and production.
Where innovation is at stake, the analysis of incentives is complicated by the need to
account for rmspricing behavior when analyzing innovation e¤ects. It is therefore necessary
to understand how a merger a¤ects incentives along two dimensions - prices and investments
in R&D - that are related. Moreover, as already pointed out, the analysis of innovation is
by nature dynamic while in most cases an analysis of unilateral e¤ects involving only price
coordination (within the merged entity) can be conducted in a static framework.
We will focus to a large extent on the e¤ect of mergers on rmsincentives to innovate
but we will also discuss their e¤ect on the merging rmsability to innovate.
10For instance, along the lines that we will develop for the analysis of innovation e¤ects, a question arises in
our car manufacturer example as to whether coordinated optimization of product lines by each brand should
be treated as part of the analysis of the merging rmsincentives to innovate or as part of the analysis of their
ability to do so.
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3.1.2 Initial impetus vs. equilibrium analysis
A second distinction that has proved useful for understanding the e¤ect of mergers is between
initial impetus11 and equilibrium behavior. A source of complexity in the analysis of unilateral
e¤ects is that a merger also a¤ects the behavior of non-merging rms, who will change prices,
quantities and, in the context of innovation, their investment in R&D. The initial impetus
refers to the e¤ect of the merger under the assumption that the behavior of non-merging rms
is not a¤ected by the merger. In the case of product market competition, the initial impetus
leads the merging rms to charge higher prices and sell less than what they would have done if
they had set their prices independently (in the absence of e¢ ciency gains). The importance of
the initial impetus stems from the idea that, while the equilibrium e¤ects resulting from rivals
responses to a merger may exacerbate the initial impetus or mitigate it, they are unlikely to
reverse it (see e.g., Whinston, 2012). Therefore, the initial impetus informs about the likely
sign of the e¤ect of a merger. Moreover, a measure of the initial impetus provides useful
insights into the likely magnitude of the e¤ect of a merger. A small initial impetus should
lead to little reaction to the merger by non-merging rms and hence to a small overall e¤ect.
This is for instance the logic behind the upward pricing pressure (UPP) analysis (Farrell
and Shapiro, 2010).
Most of the debate regarding the e¤ect of mergers on innovation is about the initial
impetus: will the merged entity innovate more or less than would the merging rms in the
absence of a merger? As far as innovation is concerned, there are two ways of thinking
about the initial impetus. One can analyze innovation incentives xing the R&D investments
of rivals but allowing all prices to adjust post-merger, as in Federico, Langus and Valletti
(2017b). Alternatively, one could analyze innovation incentives holding constant both the
prices and R&D investments of all rivals.
3.2 Product innovation
3.2.1 The innovation diversion e¤ect
Imagine a situation involving an incumbent rm that is the sole seller of a product and a
new innovative rm that is investing to develop a rival product. If the latter succeeds, it will
enter the market and divertsome of the incumbents sales: some consumers will prefer to
buy the new product instead of the incumbents. Consider now the innovative rms decision
to invest in R&D. This decision depends on R&D costs, the likelihood of success, and the
prot the innovator obtains if its investment is successful. However, the innovator will not
factor in its decision the loss of sales su¤ered by the incumbent in case of success. Suppose
now that the incumbent acquires the innovator before R&D takes place. Endowed with the
11We use the same terminology as Farrell and Shapiro (2010) and Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017b).
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innovating rms R&D technology, the incumbent will account not only for the sales of the
new product but also for the lost sales on the old product when evaluating the gain from a
successful investment. Hence, the incumbent would invest less when owning the innovating
rm than an independent innovator.
This e¤ect has been well understood at least since Arrow (1962) as it underlies Arrows
view that established incumbents have less incentives to innovate than new entrants. In the
economic literature, the fact that a rm does not internalize in its strategy the negative
impact on its rivalssales is often referred to as the business-stealing e¤ect. In particular,
this e¤ect has been discussed at length in the literature on entry in a market (see e.g., Mankiw
and Whinston, 1986).
Note that the direct diversion of sales due to an innovation is amplied by rmsreactions
in terms of pricing. As rms losing demand react by reducing their prices, price competition
between an innovator and its rivals may magnify the diversion of sales. For instance, an
innovator that invents a superior product can either divert all or part of its rivals sales
depending on its choice of price.
We will refer to the impact of a merging rms innovation on another merging rms sales
as the sales externality. Further, we will call the innovation diversion e¤ect the e¤ect of a
merger on the merging rmsincentives to innovate stemming from the internalization of the
sales externality by the merged entity. A recent and prominent illustration of this e¤ect in
merger analysis is provided by Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a).
In this paper, the authors consider N (identical) research labs that compete to invent a
product to serve a new market. One may think for instance of pharmaceutical labs trying to
develop a treatment for a disease. As research is an uncertain activity, the number of labs
that succeed in nding a treatment is random. When several products are discovered, they
are marketed and competition erodes prots. In the above terms, rmsinnovations divert
each others sales. To simplify, Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a) assume that competition
between three or more products erodes all prots. Therefore, an investor can expect positive
prots only if it is the sole successful inventor or there is only one other successful inventor.
They then consider what happens if two research labs merge. They assume that in this scenario
the two research units remain separate but the research e¤orts exerted in each of them are
coordinated by the merged entity.
Focusing on the case where the merged entity continues to invest (the same amount) in
R&D in both research units, they conclude that a merged entity controlling two research labs
would invest less in R&D than two independent labs. The main idea behind their argument
is that, when deciding its investment in one research lab, the merged entity discounts the fact
that a success would divert (cannibalize, in their terms) sales from the product discovered by
the other research lab if both succeed simultaneously. The merged entity would then invest less
because it internalizes the sales externality. They also argue that for concentrated industries,
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the reaction of non-merging rms will not be su¢ cient to o¤set the reduction of innovation
by the merging rms.
While a nice illustration of the innovation diversion e¤ect in a simple model of mergers,
Federico, Langus and Vallettis paper should be viewed as providing one factor that should
be considered, along with other factors, when evaluating innovation e¤ects in merger assess-
ment. For reasons that we now develop, concluding that mergers are always likely to impede
incentives to innovate (in the absence of e¢ ciency gains) because of the innovation diversion
e¤ect would be misleading.
Merging rms may reduce the number of research projects but invest more in
the remaining ones. A crucial assumption in the model by Federico, Langus and Valletti
(2017) is that the merged entity will choose to maintain both research units active. As shown
by Denicolò and Polo (2018a, 2018b), this assumption holds only under certain conditions.
Denicolò and Polo establish that the merged entity may nd it optimal to shut down one
research lab and focus on the other one. In this case, reduced rivalry at the research level (due
to the removal of one competitor) would induce rms to invest individually more than without
the merger. Through this e¤ect the merger may boost total investment and benet consumers.
More precisely, the logic behind their nding is the following. A merged entity investing in two
research paths internalizes potential cannibalization of sales in case of innovation duplication,
that is, if both research investigations succeed in bringing new (substitutable) products to the
market. This provides the merged entity with incentives to reduce its e¤ort in one research
path. But this reduction raises the value of investing in the other research path as it is more
likely now that it will lead to a single innovation. A consequence is that the merged entity
may be tempted to reduce drastically its e¤ort in one research path and increase substantially
its e¤ort in the other one. Whether it will do so or will instead reduce uniformly its e¤orts
on both research paths depends on the extent of decreasing returns in R&D. In particular,
when the R&D technology involves little decreasing returns at the research unit level, the
merged entity will focus all its e¤ort on one research path. The resulting likelihood that an
innovation will occur may be larger than in the no-merger scenario where both research paths
are followed but with little e¤ort (due to the risk of duplication).
The innovation diversion e¤ect may be either positive or negative depending
on the sign of the sales externality. An important feature of the setup considered by
Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a) is that innovation by one rm always diverts sales
from its rivals.12 However, this need not always be the case. Unlike a price reduction in a
price competition game, an increase in R&D activity by one rm does not always hurt its
competitors. The reason is that there are several ways through which R&D allows a rm to
12The same applies for Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017b).
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make additional prots. In order to escape intense competition, a rm may invest in R&D
to o¤er a product that is better than its rivals, but it can also invest to propose a product
that is di¤erent from its competitors. Most rivalry in innovation combines both dimensions.
For instance, smartphone producers clearly invest to improve the quality of their products,
but they do so in part by introducing features that make these products di¤erent from those
o¤ered by their rivals. While innovation leading to vertical di¤erentiation (i.e., resulting in
a product of higher quality) would induce a diversion of rivalssales, innovation leading to
horizontal di¤erentiation (i.e., allowing the innovator to appeal to di¤erent customers than its
competitors) may be benecial to rivals. This is illustrated in Bourreau, Lefouili and Jullien
(2018) in a simple variant of the Hotelling duopoly model. In that setting, R&D allows to
modify product characteristics so that the new product becomes relatively more attractive
for consumers who are less interested in the competitors product. A consequence is that
R&D investment by one rm relaxes price competition and allows its competitor to sell more
(potentially at higher prices). As a rms innovation raises rivals demand, the innovation
diversion e¤ect is positive: it leads to an increase in the merging rmsincentives to invest
in R&D aimed at increasing horizontal di¤erentiation (as compared to the case where they
would have remained independent).
The di¤erentiation e¤ect described above is related to the analysis underlying the state-
ment in the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines that a merger is not likely to lead to uni-
lateral elevation of prices of di¤erentiated products if, in response to such an e¤ect, rival
sellers likely would replace any localized competition lost through the merger by repositioning
their product lines. The fact that rms may innovate to repositionthemselves away from
competitors is well-documented in the literature and emphasized for instance by Gandhi et
al. (2008). These authors adapt a standard model from the empirical literature (commonly
used in merger analysis) to allow rms to choose product positioning as well as prices. Focus-
ing on price competition, they conclude that, along the lines of the U.S. Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, combining close substitute products creates a strong incentive for the merged
rm to separate those products, and that this repositioning substantially mitigates the
merged rms price increases and thereby also reduces the extent to which the merged rms
price increases (see, also, the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraphs 28-30 to like
e¤ect). In the context of incentives to innovate, the same logic suggests that a merged rm
will reposition innovations toward more di¤erentiation, which mitigates sales diversion.
Of course, most innovation processes involve both vertical and horizontal di¤erentiation.
Firms benet from introducing the best and most di¤erentiated products, as they will generate
the highest margins. Thus, we expect both dimensions to be present in most mergers. One
illustration, though not in the context of mergers, is the analysis of product and process
innovation by Lin and Saggi (2002). In their paper, product innovation by one rm raises
its demand but also its rivals demand, due to lower substitutability between products after
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innovation than before.13
Let us nally notice that introducing a horizontaldimension in the innovation strategy is
a way for independent rms to guard themselves against the risk of having their sales diverted
by another innovation. If two innovations occur simultaneously, product di¤erentiation allows
rms to relax competition and reduces the negative externality that each innovator exerts on
the other one. Relaxing ex post competition is more important when it is likely that several
innovations coexist, which is precisely when the innovation diversion matters more for rms.
Thus, when the innovation diversion e¤ect is relevant, we expect rms to try to di¤erentiate
their innovations.
The innovation diversion e¤ect may be either positive or negative depending on
whether the sales externality is greater or smaller after the merger. There is a
complex and subtle relationship between price competition and sales diversion. Indeed, when
products are substitutes, rms will compete in prices and, therefore, the total value of sales
diverted by an innovation will depend on the nature of competition. An important aspect
of this issue can be illustrated as follows. Consider two rms competing on the market by
selling goods that are substitutes and suppose that a single rm innovates and improves the
quality of its product, making it more attractive to more consumers. There are several ways
through which the rm can monetize its innovation. For instance, the rm could maintain its
price despite the better quality of its product, which would induce a strong diversion of sales
of the non-innovating rm. Alternatively, the innovator could raise its price at a level such
that its volume of sales remains the same as before the innovation. In this case, the innovator
does not attract new buyers, implying that the sales of the non-innovating competitor remain
unchanged (as consumers who do not buy from the innovator have no reason to change their
behavior). This shows that the volume of diverted sales depends on how rms choose to
adjust prices. Moreover, when facing sales diversion, the non-innovating competitor will react
by changing its prices. The resulting price competition will a¤ect both the returns from
innovation and the value of diverted sales.
In this context, the merged entity will adapt its whole strategy to internalize the sales
externality. In particular, it will coordinate post-innovation prices accounting for the price
externality (Greenstein and Ramey, 1998; Chen and Schwartz, 2013) and may also reposition
its products and research lines. In other words, the merged rm will shape its strategy in
order to raise appropriability and reduce cannibalization between the two merging rms. The
implications of this for the merged rms investment in R&D is in general complex.
In the Appendix, we present a simple extension of the model developed by Federico, Langus
13Another illustration is the pharmaceutical industry where an innovation may be drastic(creating a new
therapeutic class) or di¤erentiated within an existing therapeutic class (see e.g., Bardey, Bommier and Jullien,
2010, and González, Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 2016).
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and Valletti (2017a) where innovators products are di¤erentiated, and show that in this
context, a merger may raise the level of investment in R&D (see Conclusion 3) and may benet
consumers. We maintain the assumption that non-integrated rms obtain positive duopoly
prots if they both innovate. However, a di¤erence with Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a)
is that we do not assume that the merged entitys prot is the same with one innovation and
with two innovations. Instead, when both research labs innovate, the merged entity obtains two
di¤erentiated products and brings both products to the market, adjusting prices to mitigate
cannibalization between them. Therefore, it obtains a higher prot with two innovations than
with a single innovation. We show that in this context, a merger fosters innovation if the
incremental prot that a second innovation generates for the merged entity is larger than
the duopoly prot that each non-integrated innovator obtains when both rms innovate. We
present a simple and standard setup (the Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs)
where the merged entity eliminates cannibalization by raising prices. As a result, the merger
entity invests more in R&D than independent rms.
In a second paper, Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017b) consider a richer model in order
to allow explicitly for the interaction between the internalization of the sales externality and
price competition. They consider a symmetric oligopoly where rms invest in improving the
quality of their products and assume that an innovation replaces the old product with a new,
better product. Thus, innovation in their model is purely vertical. They then study the e¤ect
of a merger between two rms on the incentives to innovate, assuming away any spillovers or
e¢ ciencies. For this purpose, they decompose the impact of a merger into two terms: one
term summing up the consequences of unilateral e¤ects in prices on innovation, and another
one measuring the innovation diversion e¤ect. The authors do not solve analytically the model
but, instead, discuss the e¤ects at work and perform numerical simulations. They obtain two
results:
 Their simulations nd that there are conicting e¤ects in the models they consider:
the e¤ect of the merger on the pre- and post-innovation price equilibrium raises the
incentives to innovate, while the innovation diversion e¤ect reduces these incentives.
 In the simulations they perform, the latter e¤ect dominates so that overall impact of a
merger on the merging rmsinnovation e¤orts is negative, and so is the e¤ect of the
merger on consumers.
It is di¢ cult to draw lessons from this paper as the simulation exercise remains limited
in terms of demand formulation and parameters. Given the existence of conicting e¤ects,
whether other model specications may reverse the second conclusion is an open question.
The authors emphasize the fact that the parametric models they use are standard models.
However, one should keep in mind that standardmodels have special features that make
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them tractable at the cost of structural restrictions that may shape the relative weight of
conicting e¤ects. This is illustrated by the model provided in the Appendix and discussed
above. Moreover, the most common and simpler model specications tend to capture only
some types of innovation. For instance, a common modeling approach in the literature is to
require all consumers to attach the same value to an increase in product quality. Another
standard model assumes that consumers care only about the product of the quantity they
buy and the quality of the good. Consequently, a conclusion grounded on these models may
not apply in alternative settings.
For new products, the impact of a merger on innovation is small if the sales
externality is large and merged rms maintain all research projects. A key, yet
under-discussed, result in Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a) is that when the sales exter-
nality is maximal (i.e., when competition erodes all prots if two labs succeed in developing
a new product), a merger has no impact on innovation.14 We illustrate this result in the
Appendix where we show in a simple two-rm setting that the merged entity has the same
incentives to innovate as two independent rms when the sales externality is maximal (see
Conclusion 2). The reason is that the value of a second innovation is zero in both cases. In the
absence of a merger, a second innovator obtains no prot because product market competition
dissipates both innovatorsprots. In case a merger occurs, the second innovation does not
bring any additional value to the merged entity since the rst innovation exhausts monopoly
prot. When the merged entity chooses to invest in both projects, it cares only about the
success of one of the projects. Moreover, the gain in case of a single success is the same for the
merged entity and an independent rm; it is equal to the monopoly prot. Because of this, it
turns out that the merged entity invests the same amount than two independent rms.15
This is not to say that there is no e¤ect in general as full diversion (which occurs under price
competition if all labs develop the same homogeneous product) is an extreme case. Moreover,
the conclusion that the merger has no impact on innovation when the sales externality is
maximal holds only in a setting where an innovator comes up with a new product that does
not a¤ect the sales of its own old products if any.16 That said, this conclusion implies that,
when it comes to the invention of new products, the impact of a merger on innovation may
be small when the sales externality is large.17 This is the case for instance for winner-takes-all
competition (Sah and Stiglitz, 1987), which sometimes occurs for goods with network e¤ects.
Further, it is obvious that when the sales externality is small, the associated e¤ect is also
14The same point has been made in a more general setting by Sah and Stiglitz (1987).
15As a consequence, the merger does not a¤ect the non-merging rmsinvestment in R&D either.
16Otherwise, the standard Arrow e¤ect combined with the market power e¤ect of a merger would imply that
a merger reduces innovation.
17 In Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a), the negative e¤ect of a merger on consumer surplus is mostly
due to the standard price coordination induced by the merger rather than to innovation e¤ects.
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small. Therefore, it is only for intermediate levels of sales externality that the innovation
diversion e¤ect plays a signicant role.
3.2.2 Demand expansion e¤ect and margin expansion e¤ect
There has been a debate over recent years about the potential e¤ect of mergers on the adoption
of new technologies by telecommunication operators. Contrasting views have been expressed.
One view is that a merger, by reducing rivalry, would reduce incentives to gain a competitive
advantage through the deployment of ber landscape networks, or 4G antennas in the case
of mobile telephony. The other view is that, due to higher margins and e¢ ciency gains, a
merger would enhance investment in the deployment of the most advanced technology.
Bourreau and Jullien (2017) contribute to this debate by considering the e¤ect of a merger
on the incentives of rms to invest in coveragefor a new technology, where coverage deter-
mines which part of the population can access the service o¤ered by a rm. In their two-rm
setup, di¤erent levels of coverage are chosen by the rms. The one with the larger coverage
serves both a contestabledemand served by the other rm as well as a captivedemand
for which it is a monopolist. Prices are the same for the contestable demand and the captive
demand, and reect the di¤erences in coverage: the rm with the larger coverage chooses
a higher price than its competitor (because some of its demand is captive). Bourreau and
Jullien (2017) then compare the outcome under competition with the outcome when the two
rms merge, and conclude that the merged entity will expand total coverage and reduce the
contestable demand. The e¤ect of market expansion can be so strong that under some para-
meter values it can outweigh the e¤ect of the merger on prices, leading to a positive e¤ect of
the merger on total welfare and consumer surplus.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. If, in the duopoly situation, the contestable
demand (determined by the coverage of the smaller rm) is a relatively large share of the
total demand (determined by the larger coverage), then competition is intense and margins
are constrained. The incentive to spend resources to expand coverage depends on the return
to investment and, therefore, on the equilibrium margin. It follows that a larger contestable
demand reduces the larger rms incentive to expand the non-contestable demand (because it
reduces margins) and, therefore, total coverage. When the two rms merge, the merged entity
raises margins on the two services o¤ered to consumers. This raises the return on investment
in coverage expansion and, therefore, leads to a higher total coverage.
The paper by Bourreau and Jullien (2017) is admittedly specic to technology adoption,
but it brings two key insights. First, it shows that for some types of innovation, a merger
may indeed lead to an increase in the level of investment even in the absence of spillovers and
e¢ ciencies. Second, it highlights when and why this may occur.
Consider now an innovator replacing an old product with a new one. The new product is of
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better quality and thus generates more sales. As already discussed, an innovator introducing
a new product needs to decide on how to balance its margin and sales so as to maximize
prots. The key element in this trade-o¤ is the own price-elasticity of demand:18 if the post-
innovation demand faced by the innovator is signicantly less elastic than the pre-innovation
demand, then the innovator will set the price of the new product above the price of the old
product. However, if the post-innovation demand is as elastic as the pre-innovation demand,
the innovator will prefer to maintain the price at its pre-innovation level, and sell higher
quantities. When the rm competes in the market with sellers of substitutable products, this
trade-o¤ is also a¤ected by the behavior of competitors, but a similar logic applies.
Let us now consider the case in which innovation does not a¤ect signicantly the innova-
tors margin (because innovation increases the level of demand but does not have a signicant
e¤ect on the price-elasticity of demand). For the sake of argument, assume that innovation
does not a¤ect the innovators margin at all. In this case, innovation is solely motivated by
the willingness to expand demand and the prot from innovation can be written as
M0  (Q1(X) Q0) X;
where M0 is the pre-innovation margin, Q0 is the pre-innovation quantity and Q1(X) is the
post-innovation quantity sold for an investment X in R&D. The key driver of innovation
in this setting is the margin M0, whose level is a¤ected in particular by the intensity of
competition. Suppose now that an innovative rm merges with the seller of a competing
good (for conciseness, suppose this seller cannot innovate). As a consequence of less intense
competition, the margins will increase on all products and, in particular, M0 will increase.
It follows that the innovator will have higher benets from expanding demand and thus will
invest more to do so. We call this the demand expansion e¤ect.
While this e¤ect is quite transparent in the above example, we argue below that it is
actually present in all mergers involving product innovation. We summarize it as follows:
Higher post-merger margins raise incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation.
In contrast, let us now consider the case in which innovation a¤ects mostly the margin,
both in the merger scenario and in the absence of a merger. Innovation is then mostly moti-
vated by the willingness to increase the margin rather than sales. Assume that the volume of
sales is not a¤ected by innovation. Then, we can write the innovation prot as
(M1 (X) M0) Q0  X;
where M1 (X) is the post-innovation margin. In this case, the key driver of innovation is
18The own-price-elasticity of demand measures the sensitivity of demand to the price of a rms own product.
In contrast, the cross-price-elasticity measures the sensitivity of demand to the price of a rivals product.
18
the pre-innovation volume of sales Q0: This quantity depends on market structure. If the
innovative rm merges with a competitor, standard merger analysis shows that, absent e¢ -
ciency gains, the new entity is expected to produce less than in the no-merger scenario. As
a consequence of the reduction in the volume of sales Q0; the new entity will invest less in
margin-enhancing innovation. We call this the margin expansion e¤ect.
Again, this e¤ect will be present to a variable extent in all merger situations involving
product innovation. We summarize it as follows:
Lower post-merger output reduces incentives to invest in margin-enhancing innovation.
The demand expansion e¤ect and the margin expansion e¤ect are essential e¤ects that
need to be considered, along with the innovation diversion e¤ect, when evaluating the likely
impact of a merger on the incentives to innovate. In general, the innovative rm will increase
both margins and quantity so that both e¤ects will coexist. We then expect these two e¤ects to
be conicting as the demand expansion e¤ect is associated with a positive impact of a merger
on innovation, while the margin expansion e¤ect is associated with a negative impact on
innovation. Which e¤ect dominates depends on how innovation a¤ects the level and elasticity
of demand.
The scenario analyzed by Bourreau and Jullien (2017) is one where the demand expansion
e¤ect dominates. In contrast, Bourreau, Lefouili and Jullien (2018) show that the analysis by
Motta and Tarantino (2017) of the e¤ect of mergers on product innovation19 and the analysis
by Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017b) rely on classes of demand functions for which the
main e¤ect at work is the margin expansion e¤ect. This explains why they get a negative
impact of mergers on innovation.
More precisely, Bourreau, Lefouili and Jullien (2018) present a theoretical framework
that allows to disentangle the various e¤ects of a merger on innovation. They focus on a
symmetric duopoly model where the innovation e¤orts exerted by a rm a¤ects its demand
in a predictable way. Their analysis shows that the impact of a merger on innovation can
be decomposed into four terms corresponding to the three e¤ects discussed above and an
interaction term. More precisely,
 the margin expansion e¤ect is proportional to the reduction in demand due to price
coordination within the merged entity;
 the demand expansion e¤ect is related to the price diversion ratio which measures what
share of sales corresponds to sales diverted from the competitor when the price decreases,
and is used in UPP analysis (Farrell and Shapiro, 2010);
19Motta and Tarantino (2017) focus on process innovation in their baseline model but they analyze the e¤ect
of a merger on quality-improving innovation in an extension.
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 the innovation diversion e¤ect is related to the innovation diversion ratio - discussed
by Salinger (2016)20- which measures what share of sales corresponds to sales diverted
from the competitor when investment in innovation increases;
 the fourth term is an interaction term that cannot be signed a priori and that relates to
the change in the relative e¤ect of innovation and price on the demand when the price
increases.
The decomposition provided by Bourreau, Lefouili and Jullien (2018) allows us to identify
the key e¤ects at work and to discuss the likely impact of a merger on the merged entitys
investment in R&D under various model specications. In particular, the authors perform this
exercise for the models used in the analysis of product innovation by Motta and Tarantino
(2017) and by Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017b).21 A rst class of models considered
by both papers is one in which all consumers attach the same value to a unit increase in
quality, which implies that increasing quality has the same e¤ect on demand as decreasing
prices. Bourreau, Lefouili and Jullien (2018) show that for this particular class of models -
sometimes referred to as models with hedonic prices - the demand expansion e¤ect and the
innovation diversion e¤ect exactly cancel each other, while the interaction term is zero. The
only remaining e¤ect is the margin expansion e¤ect which is always negative. Hence, a merger
always impedes innovation in this type of models.
Motta and Tarantino (2017) also consider the class of models with quality-adjusted demand.
These models assume that consumers care about the total qualityof the good, dened as
the product of the quantity bought and the quality of the good.22 Further, Federico, Langus
and Valletti (2017b) consider a class of models with CES demand. For these two classes of
models, Bourreau, Lefouili and Jullien (2018) show that the sum of all the e¤ects is always
negative.
Thus, in the classes of models discussed above, the margin expansion e¤ect, somewhat
articially, dominates the other e¤ects. Bourreau, Lefouili and Jullien (2018) show formally
that in the framework they consider, i.e., demand-enhancing innovation in an industry which
is symmetric before the merger, most demand specications considered by Federico, Langus
and Valletti (2017b) and Motta and Tarantino (2017) can only lead to the conclusion that a
merger will impede innovation.
To illustrate the fact that other demand specications may reverse the conclusion that
these two papers reach regarding the impact of mergers on product innovation, Bourreau,
20This paper is discussed in Section 3.2.3.
21Federico et al. (2017b) model an uncertain innovation technology and assume a sequential choice of in-
novations and prices. While our results do not apply directly to their setting, the properties of the demand
functions that we demonstrate below should help explain their conclusions.
22 In this case the demand for total quality depends on the price per unit of quality. Innovation increases the
quality of the product, reducing the e¤ective per unit price of quality for a given price of the product.
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Lefouili and Jullien (2018) use the same decomposition in a model where innovation allows
two rms to di¤erentiate their products. The setting they consider is a standard extension of
the Hotelling model. In that setting, innovation raises a rms demand and relaxes price com-
petition because it increases product di¤erentiation. Therefore, both the innovation diversion
e¤ect and the demand expansion e¤ect are positive. The sum of these two e¤ects dominates
the margin expansion e¤ect, which implies that a merger raises the level of investment in
R&D.23
3.2.3 Technological spillovers
Technological spillovers refer to the phenomenon that technological improvement by one com-
pany may help other companies improve their technology as well(Salinger, 2016). Spillovers
are pervasive in the context of R&D (see e.g., Bloom et al., 2013) and are highly relevant for
the analysis of incentives in merger assessment.
In this section, we rst present spillovers that may exist regardless of whether the merger
occurs or not (dAspremont et Jacquemin, 1986; Lopez and Vives, 2016), and analyze the
way they a¤ect the impact of a merger on innovation. We then explain why a merger can
increase spillovers between the merging rms. Finally, we discuss how spillovers can be taken
into account in merger control.
A rst example of technological spillovers, that has received much attention in the litera-
ture, is the fact that a rms innovation may be imitated (to some extent) by its rivals due to
weak (enforcement of) intellectual property rights. This type of spillovers is likely to be more
prevalent for product innovations rather than process innovations as the latter can often be
e¤ectively protected by means of a trade secret, while the former typically cannot. Since the
magnitude of this type of spillovers is strongly related to the strength of intellectual property
rights, they can often be assessed without a thorough understanding of the merging partners
R&D processes.
However, there are other types of technological spillovers. In particular, spillovers may
happen when researchers present their work in conferences and publications. They may also
result from the mobility of researchers across companies. Finally, spillovers need not be
contemporaneous; they can be inter-temporal. An example is that of sequential innovations by
rivals who build upon the knowledge di¤used in patents to develop new products or processes
that do not infringe the rst innovators patent rights.24 Note that such spillovers may exist
even in the presence of relatively strong intellectual property rights.
A common feature of the spillovers discussed above is that they are positive innovation
23The interaction term is zero in this model.
24Relatedly, Whinston (2012) recalls that in a quality ladder model there is an important positive externality
across generations (each innovation enables later ones). Furthermore, Denicolò and Polo (2018b) consider the
e¤ect of mergers on the sharing of fundamental knowledge.
21
externalities and, therefore, their internalization by the merged entity has a positive e¤ect
on its incentives to invest in R&D. This e¤ect should be combined with other potential
positive e¤ects and weighted against other potential negative e¤ects of a merger on rms
incentives to innovate in the assessment of individual merger cases (Katz and Shelanski, 2007).
DAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) have been the rst to investigate theoretically the e¤ect
of cooperation between rivals at the R&D stage and/or the product market stage on the level
of R&D investment in the presence of technological spillovers. They consider a two-stage game
in which two rms decide rst to invest in a cost-reducing technology and then set the level
of their output in the product market. In their setting, a merger has two opposite e¤ects on
rmsincentives to innovate: a positive e¤ect stemming from the internalization of spillovers
by the merging rms, and a negative e¤ect resulting from the merged entitys incentives to
reduce its output which lowers the marginal benet from cost-reducing innovation.25 They
nd that the overall e¤ect of a merger on innovation is negative if spillovers are low, but is
positive if they are high.26
A merger between two innovative rms not only leads to the internalization of existing
spillovers by the merged entity but is also likely to increase the level of spillovers between the
merging rms. This follows from the very nature of the knowledge used during, or produced
by, the R&D process: it can be either transferred at no or little cost, or protected through
intellectual property rights or secrecy. In economic terms, this type of knowledge is a public
good with exclusion. By removing a motive for exclusion, a merger increases each merging rms
use of the knowledge produced by the other merging rm (Davidson and Ferret, 2007; Denicolò
and Polo, 2018b).27 For instance, in the case of process innovation, a merged entity may be
able to use the same cost-reducing technology developed by one of the merging partners to
reduce the cost of production of the other partner. The same gains arise for product innovation
when the same component (e.g., software) may be embedded in several nal products. This
implies that a merger creates economies of scale and scope in R&D as the same innovation
can be exploited across multiple business units of the merged entity.
Finally, let us discuss the way spillovers can be taken into account by competition au-
thorities in merger control. Since spillovers a¤ect rms incentives to innovate, they should
be treated as part of the main competitive assessment conducted by competition authorities.
Salinger (2016)s analysis of the change in incentives following a merger in the presence of
spillovers shows that the logic of the upward pricing pressure (UPP) methodology can be
adapted to competition in innovation, and derives a simple formula for the net innovation
pressure(NIP) that accounts for spillovers. In his setting, consumers only care about some
25This e¤ect is discussed further in Section 3.3.
26Lopez and Vives (2016) extend dAspremont and Jacquemins analysis to the case of minority shareholdings
and consider more general demand functions.
27Relatedly, a merger also removes the concern that innovation by one of the merging rms may infringe
intellectual property rights held by the other merging rm.
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product characteristics that can be improved with R&D. In other words there is competition
in innovation but not in prices.28 In such a framework, a merger has only two e¤ects on the
merging rmsincentives to invest: the innovation diversion e¤ect (see Section 3.2.1) and the
spillover e¤ect described above. When the diversion e¤ect is negative, the NIP methodology
shows that the overall e¤ect of the merger on innovation is determined by the comparison of
the diversion ratio and the spillover ratio: the merger fosters innovation if the spillover ratio
exceeds the diversion ratio and reduces it otherwise. Relatedly, Bourreau, Jullien and Lefouili
(2018) show that spillover e¤ects can be accounted for in their methodology by replacing the
innovation diversion ratio with a spillover-adjusted innovation diversion ratiowhose sign is
given by the di¤erence between the spillover ratio and the diversion ratio.
3.3 Process innovation
Motta and Tarantino (2017) provide a thorough theoretical analysis of the impact of horizontal
mergers on rmsincentives to invest in process innovation. More precisely, they analyze a
model in which rms producing di¤erentiated products choose the level of their investment
in cost-reducing innovation (in addition to setting prices).29 They rst investigate the e¤ect
of a merger to monopoly on rmsincentives to invest in R&D. This is akin to examining the
e¤ect of a merger on the merging rmsincentives to innovate holding xed the non-merging
rmsbehavior. They nd that, absent involuntary spillovers and merger-induced e¢ ciency
gains, such a merger leads to a decrease in the merged entitys investment. The key intuition
behind this nding is related to the standard market power e¤ect of mergers. The merged
entity internalizes pricing externalities, which leads to higher prices relative to the benchmark
scenario in which rms set their prices independently. This implies that the quantity produced
by the merging partners is lower than in the benchmark case. Since the benet from lowering
the unit cost of production is greater the larger the quantity produced, the merging rms
benet less from this as compared to the case where they would act independently. This
implies that the merger has a negative impact on their incentives to invest in cost-reducing
technologies.
Motta and Tarantino also consider the scenario in which only two rms (the insiders)
merge in an industry comprised of at least three rms. They conduct an equilibrium analysis
that takes account of the non-merging rms(the outsiders) response to the merger, both
in terms of prices and cost-reducing investments. The outsidersincentives to engage in cost-
reducing R&D are also driven by the e¤ects of the merger on the quantities they produce,
which is related to their prices and those of their rivals. Because the merger reduces the
competitive pressure on the outsiders, it leads to an increase of their prices, albeit at a
28Such setting may be relevant for instance for ad-supported websites o¤ering free services to users.
29See also Matsushima, Sato and Yamamoto (2013) who investigate the e¤ect of horizontal mergers when
rms can undertake process innovation in a model of quantity competition with linear demand.
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lower extent than for insiders. Since outsiders o¤er better relative prices after the merger,
their demand may increase, which would a¤ect positively their incentives to invest in cost-
reducing innovation. While this shows that a merger may have opposite e¤ects on insiders
and outsidersincentives to innovate, Motta and Tarantino nd that there are cases, in which
the impact on total investments in R&D decreases. Perhaps more importantly, they argue
that, absent spillovers and e¢ ciency gains, a merger in an industry in which rms compete
both in prices and cost-reducing investments will typically lead to lower consumer surplus.
Motta and Tarantino focus in their baseline setting on the scenario in which investment
decisions are unobservable by rivals. They then extend their analysis to the case where these
decisions are observable by rivals before they set prices. This alters the analysis because
rms now know that their cost-reducing investments will make them appear more aggressive
(because a lower cost gives them incentives to decrease their prices), which may make the
rivals also more aggressive. Because of this strategice¤ect, all rms may end up spending
less on R&D as compared to the case of unobservable investments. More importantly, this
new e¤ect makes the predictions of their model regarding the impact of the merger on both
investments and prices generally ambiguous. To cope with this, Motta and Tarantino use two
specic models to suggest that their results extend qualitatively to the case where investments
are observable.
Finally, the authors nd that a merger may have a positive overall impact on investments
and consumer surplus if involuntary spillovers are strong enough. While this nding is in line
with our previous discussion on the importance of taking spillovers into account in merger
control, Motta and Tarantino ignore this e¤ect (or considers it to be second order with respect
to the margin expansion e¤ect) in their conclusion, where they state that they have showed
that, absent cost savings from the merger, both in the general model and in all the (standard)
parametric models analyzed, the merging rms will always reduce their investments.30
Motta and Tarantinos analysis of the e¤ect of mergers on process innovation when invest-
ments are unobservable to rivals di¤ers fundamuntally from the analysis of product innovation
for two reasons. First, unlike the diversion e¤ect, the margin expansion e¤ect driving their
results has a clear-cut, negative sign. Second, there is no countervailing demand expansion
e¤ect in the case of process innovation. Their analysis of the case in which investments are
observable shows that the e¤ect of mergers is generally ambiguous, and only establishes that
their main result still holds in this scenario in two specic models. This, combined with the
fact that technological spillovers seem to be relegated by the authors to a second-order status
makes us disagree with their claim that absent e¢ ciency gains, the well-known detrimental
30 In their extension on spillovers, Motta and Tarantino note that "there is a close parallel between the model
with involuntary spillovers and the model with economies of scale in the investment function: in both cases,
the merger will allow to internalize an externality." They seem to conclude from this that spillovers should be
treated the same was as e¢ ciencies a¤ecting the merging rmsability to innovate, even though spillovers only
a¤ect their incentives to innovate.
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e¤ects of the merger are conrmed in an environment where rms set not only prices but also
investments.31
4 R&D complementarities
Perhaps more than in any other activity, talent is both a key factor for R&D and a scarce
resource. A merger fosters the interactions between researchers with di¤erent experiences.
By pooling talents from two research entities, it may induce creative emulation and foster
new innovative ideas. Moreover, by reallocating talents towards the most promising research
projects, a merged entity may raise its research productivity.
The existence of complementarities between merging rmsR&D assets has been empha-
sized in particular by Davidson and Ferret (2007) and Motta and Tarantino (2017). Comment-
ing on the clearance by the Federal Trade Commission of the merger between BP Amoco and
Atlantic Richeld, Davidson and Ferret argue that horizontal mergers are often driven by
the opportunities they create (via knowledge transfers between plants) for the exploitation of
R&D complementarities. Davidson and Ferret refers to the e¤ect of R&D complementarities
as the R&D pooling e¤ect.
Pooling of R&D assets de facto reduces production costs or raises the quality of the prod-
ucts o¤ered to consumers. It occurs, for instance, when a process innovation by one merging
partner reduces the production cost of the other partner. Moreover, it fosters the merged
entitys returns to R&D spending and, therefore, the merged rms investment in R&D. Just
as production complementarities raise the merged rms incentives to expand output, com-
plementarities in R&D raise the merged rms incentives to expand R&D. In Davidson and
Ferrets analysis of mergers with cost-reducing R&D, the nal outcome of the merger results
from the interaction of the R&D pooling e¤ect and the standard market power e¤ect of merg-
ers. Analyzing merger protability, they conclude that for technically close brands, bilateral
mergers in multidimensional competition benet the insiders but harm outsiders indepen-
dently of the strategic variable.32 The condition in this statement that brands should be
technically close is needed to ensure that R&D complementarities in process innovation will
be large. Motta and Tarantino (2017) also examine the e¤ect of R&D complementarities in
the case of process innovation, by assuming that a merger generates positive cost externalities
in the R&D process. They conrm that when there are su¢ cient R&D complementarities, a
merger would result in lower costs, lower prices and higher consumer surplus.
We must also emphasize that e¢ ciency gains in production matter for the impact of
31Note that in Motta and Tarantinos setting, even in the absence of e¢ ciency gains in R&D, the impact
of a merger on innovation can be positive if there are signicant e¢ ciency gains in production. This will be
discussed further in Section 4.
32The notion of strategic variable refers to the distinction between competition in prices and competition in
quantities.
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mergers on innovation. This is particularly clear in the case of process innovation. Consider
the margin expansion e¤ect identied by Motta and Tarantino (2017). If there are signicant
e¢ ciency gains in production then the merger will tend to decrease prices. Therefore, the
merging rmss total output may be higher than their pre-merger total output. In this case,
the same margin expansion e¤ect highlighted by Motta and Tarantino will lead to an increase
in the merged entitys investment in process innovation. One implication is that e¢ ciency
gains that would be su¢ cient to o¤set the negative e¤ect of the merger on prices would also
remove any concern regarding a potential negative e¤ect of the merger on process innovation.
A shown by Bourreau, Jullien and Lefouili (2018), e¢ ciency gains in the production stage
also matter for the impact of mergers on product innovation. The demand expansion e¤ect
relies on the fact that the marginal benet from engaging in demand-enhancing innovation is
greater the larger the rms price-cost margin. An increase in the margin can be generated by
an increase of prices but it can also result from a decrease in (marginal) production costs due to
e¢ ciency gains in production. In the presence of such gains, we expect the price-cost margin
to be greater than in their absence,33 which would magnify the demand expansion e¤ect.
Moreover, the same argument as above shows that the margin expansion e¤ect may become
positive. This would mitigate concerns about the impact of a merger on R&D investment.
5 Conclusions and policy implications
We argue that the academic literature on mergers and innovation does not support a presump-
tion of a negative impact of mergers on innovation. This conclusion follows from the existence
of potential positive e¤ects of mergers on innovation, even in the absence of spillovers and
R&D complementarities. Leaving aside spillovers in the rst part of our analysis, we identied
three main e¤ects of mergers on the incentives to innovate: the innovation diversion e¤ect,
the demand expansion e¤ect and the margin expansion e¤ect. While the last one provides
the merged entity with lower incentives to innovate, the second one provides it with higher
incentives to innovate, and the sign of the rst one depends on the nature of innovation. We
show that the combination of these e¤ects can result in either a positive or negative impact
of a merger on innovation.
Our analysis strongly suggests that competition authorities should take a neutral perspec-
tive when assessing the impact of a merger on innovation, and should balance the various
e¤ects at work. Competition authorities should take account of both theories of harm and
benets. All the e¤ects of a merger on the incentives to innovate identied in this paper,
including spillover e¤ects, should be part of the main competitive assessment carried out by
competition authorities. Insofar as the demand expansion and margin expansion e¤ects are
33This is because a decrease in cost is usually passed on only partially to consumers (i.e., the so-called
pass-through rate is less than 100%).
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part of the appropriability dimension of a merger, appropriability must be a key element in
merger analysis, at par with other dimensions. In particular, there should not be a hierarchi-
cal bias towards the diversion/cannibalization aspect when analyzing the e¤ects of mergers
on innovation. Such bias could result from the main message of Federico, Langus and Valletti
(2017a) that the internalization of the innovation externality remains the dominant driver
of the impact of the merger on innovation incentives. Introducing an unjustied leaning
towards the diversion e¤ect in merger policy would be detrimental to innovation both in the
short run (by blocking innovation-friendly mergers) and in the long run (by reducing the
protability of innovative activities). Relatedly, note that the potential positive e¤ects of a
merger on innovation are not of a fundamentally di¤erent nature from its potential negative
e¤ects: on the one hand, both the innovation diversion e¤ect and the spillover e¤ect capture
externalities exerted by an innovative rm on its rivals and, on the other hand, the demand
expansion e¤ect and the margin expansion e¤ect are the two sides of the same coin.
Finally, we view the analysis of technological spillovers as an important part of the dis-
cussion about innovation externalities in merger analysis, at par with the diversion e¤ect.
Indeed, both spillovers and sales diversion a¤ect incentives for similar reasons, although pos-
sibly in di¤erent directions. We also want to emphasize that spillovers should not be related
exclusively to imitation and, therefore, to the strength of intellectual property rights. As we
argued, there are direct spillovers in R&D activities as well as inter-temporal spillovers that
enhance other rmsability to innovate in the future.
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In this Appendix, we adapt the analysis of Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a) to a setup
in which innovatorsproducts are potentially di¤erentiated. We show that their main result,
i.e., that a merger reduces the merging rmsincentives to innovate, hinges on the following
assumption: the merged entitys incremental gain from a second innovation is smaller than
the prot of an innovator when both rms innovate in the no-merger scenario. When this
assumption does not hold, as is the case in the standard Hotelling model with quadratic
transportation costs, a merger can lead to more innovation by the merging rms and can
benet consumers.
For the sake of simplicity, let us consider a situation involving two rms only, denoted
rm 1 and rm 2. This implies that the merger will be a merger to monopoly. Suppose that
each rm is a research lab searching for an innovation that will create a new market. Initially,
each rm is inactive in the product market but actively conducts research. Firm i 2 f1; 2g
may succeed in innovating with a probability i that depends on the level of investment in
R&D. It costs a rm C(i) to achieve a probability i to innovate. Success is independent
between rms, meaning that whether a rm innovates or not is a¤ected by neither the other
rms investment in R&D nor the other rms success.
When a rm is the sole innovator on the market it obtains a value 1 from marketing
the product, equal to the monopoly prot. When both rms innovate, they obtain each a
duopoly prot 2 that is less than 1. For example, if the product is the same for both rms
and rms compete in prices, the value of 2 is zero. If they compete à la Cournot or if
there is some di¤erentiation between the rmsproducts, then 2 will be positive.
Consider a rm i 2 f1; 2g ; and suppose that the other rm, denoted j; chooses an invest-
ment C (j) leading to a likelihood of innovation j : Then, the prot of rm i is
i f(1  j)1 + j2g   C(i):
When rm i succeeds (which happens with probability i), there is a chance 1   j that
the other rm fails to innovate, in which case rm i is a monopoly, and a chance j that the
other rm succeeds, in which case rm i obtains only the duopoly prot.
Assuming that C(:) is a convex function, the best-replyof rm i is to invest at a level
that results in a probability of success i which solves the following rst-order condition:
(1  j)1 + j2 = C 0(i):
In a symmetric equilibrium of the innovation game, both rms choose the same probability
 of success, which must be the unique solution of the following equation:
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(1  )1 + 2 = C 0():
Let us now consider what happens if the two rms merge. We assume that there are
no complementarities in R&D, so that the merged entity can only coordinate the research
programs and the prices on the product market. The merged entity chooses the likelihood
of success 1 and 2 for the lab of rm 1 and that of rm 2, respectively. When only one
lab is successful, the merged entity obtains the monopoly prot 1. But when both labs are
successful, the merged entity coordinates the marketing of the two innovations which allows
it to obtain the total monopoly prot 2, which is larger than or equal to 1: For example, if
the two innovative products are identical, the prot 1 and 2 will be equal. By contrast, if
the products are di¤erentiated, the prot with two products is larger than with one product,
i.e., 2 > 1:
The merged entitys prot can then be written as
1 (1  2)1 + 2 (1  1)1 + 122   C(1)  C (2) :
We assume in what follows - as Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a) implicitly do - that
the cost function C is convex enough to ensure that the prot function above is concave and
that it is optimal for the merged entity to invest the same amount in both research labs.34 In
this case, the prot is maximized at 1 = 2 = m; the solution of
max

2 (1  )1 + 22   2C():
The likelihood of success of each research project is then the solution of the optimality con-
dition:
(1  m)1 + m (2  1) = C 0 (m) :
The comparison of the optimality condition for the merged entity and the equilibrium
condition for the duopoly leads to the following result:
Conclusion 1 The merged entity invests less in innovation than the duopoly rms if and
only if 2   1 < 2; i.e., if the merged entitys incremental gain from a second innovation
is smaller than the prot of an innovator when both rms innovate in the no-merger scenario.
A second immediate implication of the analysis is that when 2   1 = 2 = 0; the
optimality conditions and, therefore, the levels of innovation in the two scenarios coincide.
The case 2   1 = 2 = 0 corresponds to the case where the sales externality is so large
that the value of a second innovation is nil (e.g., Bertrand competition with homogenous
products). By continuity, we get the following result:
34Denicolò and Polo (2017) show that this property may not hold if C is only slightly convex.
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Conclusion 2 The investment in innovation of the merged entity is equal (resp. close) to
the level of investment of duopoly rms if 2  1 and 2 are equal (resp. close) to zero, i.e.
if the sales externality is maximal (resp., very large).
An implicit assumption in the analysis of Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a) is that
2   1 = 0 < 2:35 This property holds for instance under Cournot competition if the
two innovative products are identical. However, when there is some product di¤erentiation
between the two innovations, it is possible that 2 1 > 2; in which case the merged entity
will invest more in innovation. We now illustrate this in a standard Hotelling model.
Illustration of an innovation-friendly merger Consider the Hotelling model with quadratic
transportation costs. Consumers are located uniformly on a segment of size 1: Each rm is
located at one extreme of the segment. Indexing location from 0 to 1, we assume that rm 1
is located at x1 = 0 and rm 2 is located at x2 = 1: An innovation by rm i 2 f1; 2g leads to
a product whose consumption by a consumer generates a gross utility U (if rm i does not
innovate, it is not active in the market). To purchase from rm i 2 f1; 2g, a consumer located
at x incurs a transportation cost td2 where d = jxi   xj is the distance to rm i. Thus, a
consumer buying at price p from a rm at distance d obtains utility U   td2   p. We assume
in what follows that U  3t=4.




the market if U < 3t, while it charges the price U   t and covers the market if U  3t. The





3 if U < 3t and 1 = U   t if U  3t.36 In
the duopoly case, if both rms innovate they compete by setting prices and consumers decide
where to buy. It is well known (see e.g., Tirole, 1988) that in equilibrium, each rm serves
half of the market at price p = t. It follows that the duopoly prot is 2 = t=2:
Suppose now that the two rms merge. If only one research lab succeeds in innovating,
the prot of the merged entity is 1. When both labs succeed, the merged entity can sell the
two products. When the rm sets a price p (for both products), the total demand is 1 as
long as p  U   t=4 (as long as the consumer located at an equal distance from both rms is
willing to buy), and it is 2
p
(U   p) =t for larger p: Under our assumptions, the merged entity
chooses the price p = U   t=4, serves all the market and obtains a prot 2 = U   t=4:
The comparison of the incremental monopoly prot from a second innovation and a single
rm duopoly prot shows that for U=t > 1:362, we have
2  1 > 2
35Feredico, Langus and Valletti (2017b) relax this assumption.
36We assume, for the sake of exposition, that marginal costs of production are equal to zero.
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Conclusion 3 In the Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs and U=t > 1:362,
a merger leads to more innovation by the merging rms.
It is important to emphasize that the merger not only leads to more innovation but may







9 if U < 3t
2t




; CSD = U   13t
12
;
for the single-product monopoly case, the multi-product monopoly case and the duopoly
case, respectively. Therefore, the expected consumer surplus in the absence of a merger is
CS = 2 (1  )CSM1 + ()2CSD;
while in the case of a merger it is given by
CSM = 2M
 
1  MCSM1 +  M2CSM2:
Both functions are increasing in the range  2 [0; 1=2] from 0 to some upper bound, and
CS > CSM . Hence, in this range, a merger raises consumer surplus if M is su¢ ciently
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We conclude that  < M if and only if the marginal gain of innovation at S () is strictly








S () (2   21)
1 + 
 (2  1) :
As an illustration, we normalize the transport cost to t = 1 and consider the case in which






































Assume now that C () = 1+
1+ where  > 0 and  is chosen so that the monopoly
maximization program has a symmetric solution (this implies that  is small). Then, a




































which is equivalent to








































We plot below the value of :











Maximal curvature  as a function of 
A merger raises expected consumer surplus if  is not too large and  is large. The graph shows
that this is the case for  < 0:22 and  small. Therefore, when the likelihood of innovation
 is small and the innovation technology does not involve strong decreasing returns to scale,
a merger raises consumer surplus despite the induced increase in prices.
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